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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge: 
 
Dean Dungan appeals from the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment to all defendants in an action in which 
Dungan alleges that the defendants discriminated against 
him on the basis of age and violated his constitutional 
rights to due process and equal protection. Because we 
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agree with the District Court that Dungan's complaint did 
not state a cause of action under either the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. S 621 et seq., 
or the Fifth Amendment, we shall affirm the judgment of 




Dungan began working as an air traffic contr oller (ATC) 
in 1974. ATCs at major airports in the U.S. ar e employees 
of the Federal Aviation Administration (F AA), an agency of 
the Department of Transportation (DOT). Like all ATCs who 
were hired between 1972 and 1987, Dungan was a member 
of the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). 5 U.S.C. 
S 8301 et seq. The CSRS requir ed that an ATC "shall be 
separated from service on the last day of the month in 
which he [or she] becomes 56 years of age." 5 U.S.C. 
S 8335(a). The Secretary of Transportation, however, was 
given the discretion to permit an A TC "having exceptional 
skills and experience" to work until age sixty one. Id. The 
CSRS compensated ATCs for this early mandatory 
retirement by providing them with mor e generous benefits 
than were received by other federal employees.1 
 
In 1981, thousands of ATCs who were members of the 
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) 
went on strike. Dungan did not join this strike. The striking 
PATCO members were fired by President Reagan, who 
barred them from working in any positions with the FAA. In 
August 1993, President Clinton issued an or der permitting 
the former strikers to be rehired as ATCs. Some 




1. For example, an ATC with twenty years of service was permitted to 
retire with a pension at age fifty, 5 U.S.C. S 8336(e), while most federal 
employees would have to achieve age sixty befor e being given a pension 
after twenty years of service. 5 U.S.C. S 8336(b). Similarly, ATCs were 
guaranteed a minimum pension payment of 50% of their average salary. 
5 U.S.C. S 8339(e). Thus, an ATC r etiring after twenty years of service 
would receive a 50% pension, much more generous than the 36.25% 
that would be received by a federal employee governed by the general 
rules. 5 U.S.C. S 8339(a). 
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In 1987, Congress adopted the Federal Employee 
Retirement System (FERS), 5 U.S.C. S 8401 et seq., which 
replaced the CSRS for many employees, including ATCs, 
hired after that point. While the FERS changed the 
retirement scheme for federal employees in many ways, the 
change most relevant to this case is that it modified the 
mandatory retirement age for ATCs. Under the FERS, an 
ATC is not required to retir e until reaching twenty years of 
service or age fifty-six, whichever came later . 5 U.S.C. 
S 8425(a). Thus, an ATC who enter ed service after age 
thirty-six would be permitted to work past agefifty-six. The 
FERS continued to give the Secretary of T ransportation the 
discretion to allow an ATC to work until r eaching age sixty- 
one. Id. The retirement of A TCs who were hired before 1987 
continues to be governed by the CSRS, although they were 
given opportunities to change their enrollment from the 
CSRS to the FERS. Similarly, PATCO members who had 
been covered by the CSRS and were r ehired after President 
Clinton's order in 1993 were permitted to choose between 
the two retirement programs. It is undisputed that some of 
the rehired PATCO ATCs ar e being permitted to work past 
age fifty-six. 
 
On June 15, 1998, well before his fifty-sixth birthday, 
Dungan wrote to his division manager seeking a waiver of 
the mandatory retirement age so that he could work until 
age sixty-one. Pursuant to the statutory grant of authority 
contained in 5 U.S.C. S 8335(a), the Secr etary of 
Transportation had delegated authority to grant such 
waivers to the Administrator of the FAA. 49 C.F.R. S 1.45(a). 
The Administrator has adopted an internal pr ocedure 
under which any waiver request must be r eviewed by 
several intermediate officials befor e being considered by the 
Administrator and the Secretary. If any one of those 
intermediate officials does not appr ove the request, it is 
automatically denied. In October 1995, the F AA announced 
that for the foreseeable future, r equests for waivers would 
not be forwarded to the Administrator, effectively cutting off 
any possibility of seeking an extension past the mandatory 
retirement age. Consistent with this policy, Dungan's 
waiver request was denied by the regional manager. 
 
On May 7, 1999, Dungan filed a four-count complaint in 
the District Court. Count I alleged that the Secr etary 
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violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
by requiring Dungan to retire at agefifty-six while allowing 
other ATCs to work past age fifty-six. In Count II, Dungan 
contended that the Administrator violated the ADEA by 
refusing to submit Dungan's waiver request to the 
Secretary. In Count III, Dungan claimed that the Secretary 
violated his Fifth Amendment rights to due pr ocess and 
equal protection by refusing to consider his waiver request 
and by forcing him to retire at agefifty-six while allowing 
other ATCs to work past that age. Finally, Count IV alleged 
that the Administrator violated Dungan's due pr ocess rights 
by refusing to forward his waiver r equest to the Secretary. 
Although this complaint was styled as a class-action, the 
District Court held all class-related decisions in abeyance 
until motions to dismiss or for summary judgment could be 
considered. 
 
On February 24, 2000, the District Court granted 
defendants' motion for summary judgment on all counts. In 
a twenty-three page opinion, the District Court determined 
that the ADEA did not apply to ATCs, that Dungan had no 
due process right to have his waiver request considered by 
the Secretary, and that the differ ent retirement ages for 
different ATCs were rationally related to a legitimate 
government purpose and did not violate Dungan's right to 
equal protection. The District Court and this Court both 
subsequently denied Dungan's requests for injunctive relief 
to prevent his termination while his appeal was pending. 
 
In March 2000, Dungan reached age fifty-six. Under the 
provisions of the CSRS, he was requir ed to retire at the end 
of that month. Apparently, however, he did not timely 
receive the required sixty-day notice of termination, and he 




On appeal, Dungan disputes the District Court's 
resolution of each of his claims. He also asserts that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although there is no evidence in the r ecord before this Court, we 
assume that Dungan received the requir ed notice on or before May 2, 
2000. 
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District Court erred by not providing him with the pre-trial 
procedures mandated by the local rules of the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, and by not deciding the issue of 
class certification. 
 
A. ADEA Claims 
 
In evaluating Dungan's ADEA claims, the District Court 
noted that while the federal government had been made 
subject to the act in 1978, see 29 U.S.C.S 633a(a), 
Congress still reserved the power to statutorily impose 
mandatory retirement ages that would otherwise conflict 
with the ADEA. Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353, 357 (1985). Thus, the District 
Court properly held that the provision of the CSRS 
requiring ATCs to retire at agefifty-six did not violate the 
ADEA. 
 
Dungan argues, however, that he is not disputing the 
validity of the mandatory retirement age, but is instead 
challenging the fact that other ATCs, and in particular the 
rehired PATCO members, ar e being allowed to work past 
age fifty-six. This argument overlooks the fact that the 
mandatory retirement age of all ATCs is dictated by 
legislation properly enacted by Congress, regardless of 
whether the ATCs in question are members of the CSRS or 
the FERS. It would be paradoxical for this Court to hold 
that the FAA does not violate the ADEA when it requires an 
ATC to retire at age fifty-six under the rules of the CSRS, 
but does violate the ADEA when it permits an A TC to work 
past age fifty-six consistent with the dictates of the FERS. 
 
Because Congress explicitly authorized both mandatory 
retirement programs complained of by Dungan, they are 
outside the scope of the ADEA. On that basis, the District 
Court properly granted summary judgment to the 
defendants on Counts I and II of Dungan's complaint. 
Because this determination is dispositive of the issue, we 
shall not discuss the alternative grounds for summary 
judgment offered by the District Court. 
 
B. Equal Protection 
 
Dungan also contends that the Secretary has violated his 
Fifth Amendment right to equal protection by forcing him to 
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retire at age fifty-six while allowing other ATCs to work past 
that age. In particular, he claims that the r ehired PATCO 
members are being given unconstitutional pr eferential 
treatment because they are allowed to work past age fifty-six.3 
Because the different treatment that Congress mandated 
for different ATCs is rationally r elated to a legitimate 
government purpose, it does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment. 
 
If federal government action creates distinctions between 
classes of people, and that action does not imper missibly 
interfere with fundamental constitutional rights or burden 
a suspect class, that action does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate 
government purpose. Massachusetts Boar d of Retirement v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976). Ther e is no allegation 
in this case that the differing treatment of ATCs under the 
two retirement systems interfer es with any fundamental 
right. Further, the Supreme Court has determined that 
classifications based on age do not burden a suspect class. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313-14. In the pr esent case, the two 
retirement systems are best seen as creating a distinction 
based on the particulars of individuals' employment, 
because the question of whether an ATC will be permitted 
to work past age fifty-six is determined entirely by the 
retirement system in which he or she is enrolled. Vance v. 
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 n.10 (1979) ("Since the age factor 
is present in both groups, the gravamen of appellees' claim 
[is that the statute] discriminates on the basis of job 
classification"). 
 
The distinction created between two groups of ATCs by 
the CSRS and the FERS is clearly rationally r elated to a 
legitimate government purpose. The adoption of the FERS 
altered the method of calculating annuities for retired 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. It is clear from the briefs and fr om the record that Dungan feels a 
great deal of indignation over what he per ceives as the preferential 
treatment being given to the former strikers. In 1981, Dungan chose to 
obey the law and refused to join the PA TCO strike. Now he has been 
forced to retire at age fifty-six while some ATCs who, in his view, broke 
their faith with the FAA are being allowed to work past that age. It is 
understandable that he feels anger and frustration, but the law can 
provide no relief. 
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ATCs, and had the effect of reducing the annuity to which 
an average ATC would be entitled.4  In that context, it is 
perfectly logical that Congress would choose to grant every 
ATC an opportunity to earn at least twenty years of service 
credit, even if that meant letting some A TCs work past age 
fifty-six. It is also logical that Congress would choose not to 
force ATCs who were enrolled in the CSRS to transfer to the 
FERS, which for some ATCs would have the ef fect of 
retroactively reducing benefits. Instead, it permitted ATCs 
covered by the CSRS to select the plan in which to enroll. 
Regardless of Congress's precise motives, the Supreme 
Court has noted that federal retirement systems "are 
packages of benefits, requirements, and restrictions serving 
many different purposes. When Congr ess decided to include 
groups of employees within one system or the other, it 
made its judgments in light of those amalgamations of 
factors." Vance, 440 U.S. at 109. 
 
Dungan's claim that the rehired PA TCO members are 
being given some kind of impermissible pr eference also 
fails. It is true that when the PATCO members were fired, 
they were subject to the mandatory retir ement age of the 
CSRS, as was Dungan. When they were rehir ed, however, 
they were permitted to select between the two plans. 
Dungan had been given this same choice in 1987. 5 Because 
some of these rehired ATCs elected to be enrolled in the 
FERS and because they had fewer than twenty years of 
service at age fifty-six, they are being allowed to work to an 
older age than they would have had they never gone on 
strike. This difference is caused not by their status as 
strikers, however, but because they had a br eak in service. 
An ATC who had a similar break in service for other 
reasons would have received the same benefit. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Thus, as noted earlier, under the pr ovisions of the CSRS, an ATC 
eligible for retirement after twenty years would receive a guaranteed 50% 
pension, 5 U.S.C. S 8339(e), while under the FERS the same ATC would 
receive only a 34% pension. 5 U.S.C. S 8415(d). Of course, it is possible 
that Social Security and voluntary Thrift Savings Plan benefits would 
compensate for this difference. 
 
5. As the District Court noted, even if Dungan had elected to enroll in 
the FERS, he would have been forced to r etire at age fifty-six because he 
already had twenty years of service. 
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The Administrator and the Secretary are r equired to 
impose different mandatory retir ement schemes on different 
ATCs due to a legislative mandate. Because that mandate 
is rationally related to a legitimate gover nment purpose, it 
does not violate Dungan's right to equal protection. 
 
C. Due Process 
 
Dungan's last substantive claim is that the Administrator 
and the Secretary denied him his Fifth Amendment right to 
due process by denying his request for a waiver from the 
mandatory requirement provisions of the CSRS. This 
argument fails because Dungan had no pr operty interest in, 
or legitimate expectation of, a waiver of the mandatory 
retirement rules. 
 
Before any process is due under the Fifth Amendment, a 
claimant must demonstrate that there has been a 
deprivation of an interest in life, liberty, or property. 
Matthews v. Elderidge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). There is 
generally not a property interest in continued public 
employment unless a claimant can demonstrate a 
"legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
 
Dungan cannot maintain that he had any legitimate 
expectation to continued employment as an ATC past age 
fifty-six, or even any expectation that his waiver request 
would be submitted to the Secretary. The gover ning statute 
states that the Secretary "may exempt" an ATC from 
mandatory retirement. 5 U.S.C. S 8335(a). This clearly 
indicates that the decision as to whether to grant a waiver 
is discretionary. Further, the Secr etary is empowered to 
make this decision "under such regulations as he [or she] 
may prescribe." Id. The regulations that have been adopted 
require that an application be appr oved at every level before 
it is submitted to the Administrator and the Secr etary. Lack 
of approval at any level functions as a denial of the 
application. The decision that no waiver requests would be 
approved was clearly within the discretionary power of the 
Secretary. Dungan claims that the refusal to consider his 
request was arbitrary and capricious, but he overlooks the 
fact that the Secretary is not requir ed to consider any 
waiver request. In fact, the evidence shows that rather than 
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being arbitrary and capricious, the refusal to consider 
requests has been consistently applied since the policy was 
announced in 1995 and that no waivers have been granted 
since that time. 
 
Because Congress granted broad discr etion to the 
Secretary to make decisions about waivers, Dungan had no 
property interest in receiving a waiver or even in having his 
request considered by the Secretary. In the absence of such 
a property interest, no process was due under the Fifth 
Amendment and Dungan's constitutional rights wer e not 
violated. 
 
D. Pre-Trial Procedur es 
 
Finally, Dungan claims that the District Court err ed by 
refusing his request for certain pr e-trial procedures and by 
not making any class-related decisions. Because we will 
affirm the grant of summary judgment on the merits, we 




For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be affirmed. 
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